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Abstract
Adversarial machine learning is a well-studied field of re-
search where an adversary causes predictable errors in a ma-
chine learning algorithm through careful manipulation of the
input. Numerous techniques have been proposed to harden ma-
chine learning algorithms and mitigate the effect of adversarial
attacks. Of these techniques, adversarial training, which aug-
ments the training data with adversarial samples, has proven to
be an effective defensive technique with respect to a certain class
of attacks. However, adversarial training is computationally
expensive and its improvements are limited to a single classifier.
In this paper, we propose Adversarially-Trained Autoencoder
Augmentation, the first transferable adversarial defense that is
robust to certain adaptive adversaries. We disentangle adversar-
ial robustness from the classification pipeline by adversarially
training an autoencoder with respect to the classification loss
of a naturally trained classifier. The main advantage of our
work is that the autoencoders can be reused to protect other
vulnerable classifiers without additional training. We show that
our approach improves the adversarial robustness of a naturally
trained classifier by at least 45% inMNIST and Fashion-MNIST
datasets despite no additional training. On CIFAR-10, we can
train a single autoencoder to protect multiple naturally trained
classifiers and achieve adversarial performance on par or bet-
ter than adversarial training. Finally, using a natural image
corruption dataset, we show that our approach improves robust-
ness to naturally corrupted images, which has been identified
as strongly indicative of true adversarial robustness.
1. Introduction
Machine learning algorithms are becoming the preferred
tool to empower systems across multiple applications domains
ranging from automatically monitoring employee hygiene and
safety to influencing control decisions in self-driving cars and
trading. With such pervasive use, it is critical to understand
and address the vulnerabilities associated with machine
learning algorithms so as to mitigate the risks in real systems.
Adversarial attacks are one class of such vulnerabilities in which
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Figure 1: Overview of Adversarially-Trained Autoencoder Augmentation.
Adversarial images that would otherwise be misclassified by naturally trained
classifiers, can be adjusted and correctly classified by using AAA.
an adversary can reliably induce predictable errors in machine
learning systems. At a high-level, given a classification model
and a correctly labelled input, an adversarial attack computes
the necessary modifications on the input such that the model
incorrectly labels it, while ensuring that the modifications are
inconspicuous (i.e., imperceptible to a human observer).
To mitigate or prevent the effect of adversarial attacks,
multiple defensive techniques have been proposed. Adversarial
training is one such technique, which uses a data augmentation
strategy to improve a model’s performance in adversarial sce-
narios [20]. During training, adversarial examples are computed
on-the-fly and added to the training data. This approach has
proven to greatly improve the prediction accuracy on adversarial
inputs. However, adversarial training is a model-specific
defense and so requires retraining of the model’s parameters
to account for the adversarial noise. The robustness guarantees
are therefore limited to the updated model. Also, the process
of adversarial training introduces significant performance
overhead during training as the computationally expensive
process of generating adversarial examples must be repeated
every training step. These two limitations, together, make
adversarial training undesirable when a model’s architecture
changes or there is a need for multiple robust models. Situations
like these call for model-agnostic defenses that exhibit similar
robustness guarantees as adversarial training.
In this work, we introduce Adversarially-Trained Autoen-
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coder Augmentation (AAA), a model-agnostic defense against
adversarial attacks. We re-examine data pre-processing adversar-
ial defenses, focusing on the stacked autoencoder (AE) - classi-
fier architecture, in which a denoising AE is used to mitigate the
effect of adversarial inputs [8, 18, 21]. Traditionally, AE based
defenses train the denoising AE with a static set of adversarial
samples generated against a naturally trained classifier. Such an
AE is ‘transferable’ and is able to protect multiple vulnerable
classifiers (trained on similar natural data) against oblivious
attacks. However, these defenses are not robust to an adaptive
adversary who is aware of them and has access to the end-to-end
gradients of the stacked model. Our approach differs from pre-
vious works in that we train the AE against the aforementioned
adaptive adversary using a loss that encourages both enhanced
classification performance and transferability. Note that we do
not modify the parameters of the vulnerable classifier.
Against a PGD adversary, our approach outperforms classic
adversarial training [20] on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST by
2.32% and 6.13% respectively, and has comparable perfor-
mance to adversarial training on CIFAR-10. Furthermore, as
we’ve designed AAA to be model-agnostic, we can transfer the
adversarially trained AE to an architecturally different naturally
trained classifier and improve its adversarial accuracy by
85.33% and 45.34% for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets,
respectively. Finally, we find that on CIFAR-10, while our initial
approach does not completely enable transferability, by utilizing
ensemble adversarial training, AAA can parallelize adversarial
training across multiple classifiers and be partially transferable.
This setup allows Adversarially-Trained Autoencoder Aug-
mentation to achieve adversarial performance no worse than
adversarially training the classifiers. On average, AAA improves
a CIFAR-10 classifier’s natural and adversarial accuracy by
8.20% and 6.17% respectively compared to adversarial training.
Our Contributions.
• We propose Adversarially-Trained Autoencoder Augmen-
tation (AAA), the first transferable adversarial defense
robust to a certain class of adaptive adversaries. Through
adversarial training of an AE, we disentangle adversarial
robustness and classification enabling us to transfer adver-
sarial robustness improvements across multiple classifiers.
• On MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, Adversarially-Trained
Autoencoder Augmentation performs better than tra-
ditional adversarial training, while being completely
transferable, improving the adversarial accuracy with re-
spect to the PGD L∞ attack of an architecturally-different
classifier by 85.33% and 45.34% respectively. With
respect to the CW L2 attack, the adversarial accuracy is
improved by 76.61% and 62.67% respectively.
• On CIFAR-10, we combined our approach with ensemble
adversarial training to create a semi-transferable defense.
The resulting AE was able to achieve comparable
or improved adversarial robustness as compared to
adversarial training (8.76% improvement in adversarial
accuracy in the best case).
• We measure the natural image corruption robustness of
AAA and show that it has a higher resistance to natural
image corruptions than adversarially trained classifiers,
which, based on previous work, indicates true adversarial
robustness improvements, rather than unjustified gains
due to gradient shattering.
2. Background
Adversarial Attacks. Adversarial examples were introduced by
Szegedy et al. [29]. They showed that it was possible to generate
imperceptible non-random noise that, when added to the input
of a deep neural network, would cause an arbitrary change in
its output. Since then, numerous adversarial attacks have been
developed which can be broadly classified based on the adver-
sary’s knowledge of the model: (1) White-box attacks assume
the adversary has perfect knowledge of the parameters of the
target model. Some well known white-box attacks include the
Jacobian-Based Saliency Map (JSMA) attack, which expresses
the forward derivatives of the target model in the form of the
Jacobian matrix to generate adversarial perturbations [24], and
the Fast-Gradient Sign (FGSM) attack and its variants, which
use back-propagated gradients to find an input that maximizes a
given loss function [7, 14]. (2) Black-box attacks assume the ad-
versary only has the ability to query a model for its soft (probabil-
ity distribution) or hard (predicted label) output. In these attacks,
the adversary queries the target model and uses the responses
to estimate gradient information, which can then be used to re-
enact a white-box attack [22, 4, 2, 5]. Alternatively, it is known
that adversarial inputs are transferable. An adversarial input cre-
ated to cause misclassification errors on one model can be reused
to cause a similar effects on other models trained on the same
data despite differences in the model architectures [29]. Using
this property, an adversary can create adversarial inputs using
white-box attacks on a model they have complete access to and
then use these inputs against the black-box target model [23, 19].
Adversarial Training. Given the widespread use of machine
learning, successful adversarial attacks against deployed
systems could result in dire real-world consequences. As
such, it is critical to develop techniques to achieve adversarial
robustness. Madry et al. [20] define adversarial robustness
through the following saddle-point problem:
min
θ
ρ(θ), where ρ(θ)=E(x,y)∼pˆtrain
[
max
δ∈S
L(Fθ(x+δ),y)
]
(1)
where, θ are the parameters of a neural network classifier F
which are updated to minimize the cross-entropy objective L on
an input x∈Rd and its corresponding label y∈{1···k} drawn
from the training data distribution pˆtrain. The budget of the
adversary is defined through S ∈ Rd, which is the set of all
possible imperceptible perturbations applicable to the input x.
While the inner maximization problem can be interpreted as
the objective of an adversary, the outer minimization problem
is a formal representation of the defender’s objective. Several
techniques have been proposed to find an optimal solution for
the saddle-point problem defined in Eq 1. Madry et al. show
that certifiable robustness can be achieved by training a model
against its ’universal first-order adversary’ computed using the
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack, an iterative form of
the FGSM attack. Referred to as adversarial training, Madry
et al. demonstrated that this training process can create MNIST
and CIFAR classifiers with significant adversarial robustness
to certain adversarial inputs. Due to scalability issues on larger
datasets, several improvements, such as single-step FGSM [15]
and ensemble adversarial training [30], have been proposed to
reduce the performance overhead of adversarial training.
In a later work, Ilyas et al. developed a robust feature extrac-
tion methodology using adversarial training [11]. The penulti-
mate layer of an adversarially trained model is used to disen-
tangle robust and non-robust features. Afterwards, the original
dataset is projected into the robust feature space and a new classi-
fier is naturally trained on the robust dataset. The robust feature
extractor can be seen as a pre-processing defense, but we iden-
tify a few limitations compared to our proposed defense. First,
it is necessary to retrain a classifier on the robust dataset in order
to achieve reasonable performance. Thus, the robust feature
extractor cannot be used with other classifiers unless additional
training is performed. Second, the performance of the classifier
on the robust dataset decreases significantly. In fact, both the nat-
ural and adversarial performance of their method is worse than
the adversarially trained classifier used to build the extractor.
Denoising Defenses. As adversarial examples are typically
generated by adding noise to a correctly classified input, it
is natural to attempt to use denoising algorithms to remove
the adversarial noise. Denoising the adversarial noise before
classification can allow for adversarial robustness to be separate
from a model’s specifications. Gu and Rigazio explored using
simple denoising autoencoders (AEs) as a pre-processing step
to filter out the adversarial noise and re-project the input to the
natural data manifold [8]. Other works treat adversarial samples
as a subset of out-of-distribution samples and deploy AEs to
detect them based on the deviation of their reconstructions from
the natural data manifold [28, 21]. These works use a network
architecture formed by stacking an AE with a classifier for the
purposes of denoising or detecting adversarial inputs. However,
such defenses assume the adversary is oblivious to the defense.
An adaptive adversary attacking the end-to-end pipeline rather
than the classifier alone is able to bypass these defenses. Liao et
al. proposed two modifications to improve the robustness of the
stacked architecture defense [18]. First, the DAE was changed
to output inverse adversarial noise to correct the modified input
rather than fully denoise the original input. This change was
based on the hypothesis that learning the adversarial noise
added to an input is an easier task than learning to reconstruct
the original input. Second, they replaced the pixel-based
reconstruction loss with a loss based on the L1 distance between
the intermediate layer features of a natural and an adversarial
input. While these modifications to the original architecture
improve the robustness of the model against an oblivious
adversary, they still fail in the presence of an adaptive adversary.
AAA, in contrast, improves the adversarial robustness against
white-box adaptive adversaries in a model-agnostic manner.
Previous work has also explored using Generative Adversar-
ial Networks (GANs) as a substitute for AEs in adversarial de-
fenses [27, 10]. These defenses leverage the superior generative
capacity of GANs to transform the adversarial image into an im-
age that lies on the natural data manifold. These techniques, how-
ever, have their own drawbacks. e.g., it is possible to identify ad-
versarial samples that lie on the data manifold learnt by the gener-
ator of the GAN [1]. Also, these techniques have not been shown
to be particularly effective with complex real-world datasets.
3. Adversarially-Trained Autoencoder Augmen-
tation
The defense techniques discussed in the previous section can
be classified into model-specific and model-agnostic techniques.
Model-specific techniques implement architectural or other
invasive changes in a model to counter adversarial noise.
Some examples include adding additional transformation lay-
ers [32, 16] or modifying network weights through adversarial
re-training [20, 12]. These techniques are limited in that they
only improve adversarial robustness for a single trained model.
In contrast, model-agnostic techniques counter adversarial noise
using techniques that do not rely on a particular trained model,
thus enabling the defense to benefit multiple vulnerable models.
We observe such techniques deploy an input pre-processing
pipeline, often using autoencoders (AEs) [18, 21, 28, 8].
In this paper, we propose Adversarially-Trained Autoencoder
Augmentation (AAA), a defense that combines model-specific
adversarial training with denoising AEs to create a model-
agnostic defense technique. AAA stacks a denoising AE in front
of a naturally trained classifier and trains only the AE to denoise
adversarial noise injected into the input by an adaptive first-order
adversary using the end-to-end gradients of the stacked model.
Let Fθ be the classification function learnt by a trained
classifier, parameterized by θ. We stack a convolutional AEGφ,
parameterized by φ, in front of Fθ and form an augmented clas-
sification pipeline yˆ=Fθ(Gφ(x)). The adversarial loss ρ(θ), as
defined in Eq. 1, is modified for our stacked model as follows:
ρ(θ,φ)=E(x,y)∼pˆtrain
[
max
δ∈S
L(Fθ(Gφ(x+δ)),y)
]
(2)
Verbally, we seek to minimize the cross-entropy loss induced
by adversarial inputs pre-processed by the AE. However,
only using the cross entropy loss limits our approach to a
model-specific defense. i.e., we only observed improved
adversarial robustness for the classifier Gφ was trained with
(native classifier). Thus, we explore using reconstruction loss as
an additional loss term to encourage the AE to learn reconstruc-
tions, which can generalize across multiple models. Let Bˆ be
a batch ofm adversarial images {x˜(1),···,x˜(m)} corresponding
to batch B={x(1),···,x(m)} of natural images sampled from
pˆtrain. We obtain Bˆ from B by solving the maximization
problem in Eq. 2 using PGD. Let J(Bˆ;θ,φ) be the cost function
representing the mean of the adversarial loss in Eq. 2 computed
over batch Bˆ. Our training objective updates AE parameters φ,
while keeping classifier parameters θ constant, so as to minimize
J(Bˆ;θ,φ)+λ
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
Gφ(xˆ
(i))−x(i)
)2
(3)
where, λ is a constant that we use to balance the magnitudes
of the two losses. In the remainder of the paper, we refer cross
entropy loss, reconstruction loss, and their combination as
Lmse, Lxent, and Lxent+Lmse respectively.
We note that while AAA provides the benefits of adversarial
training in a model-agnostic manner, it does not address all
of its shortcomings. Namely, adversarial training is known to
overfit to the type of adversary it is trained against. Thus, it
remains vulnerable to some other adversarial attack methods, es-
pecially black-box attacks [22, 4, 2, 5]. We leave improving the
robustness of AAA to all known class of attacks as future work.
4. Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of AAA to
adaptive white-box adversaries. We compare our technique
to traditional adversarial training and find that AAA exhibits
similar or better performance while being transferable. Finally,
we evaluate the performance of our defense using natural image
corruptions as a sanity check against shattered gradients based
on previous research, which also links natural corruption robust-
ness to adversarial robustness [6]. Note that although the results
presented are against an adaptive adversary, AAA is similarly
robust to oblivious adversaries. For evaluation on oblivious
attacks and black-box attacks as well as model architectures,
we refer the reader to the Supplementary materials.
4.1. Experimental Setup
In our experiments, we use the objective function from Eq. 3
to train a stacked autoencoder (AE) - classifier model which we
refer to as AAA. We refer to the classifier used to ‘guide’ the
AE during its training as the native classifier. Note that native
classifier parameters are frozen at the time of AAA training. To
demonstrate that AAA is model-agnostic, we replace the native
classifier in our pipeline, at test time, with another classifier
which was independently trained on the same data as the native
classifier. We refer to this classifier as the transfer classifier and
we chose it to have considerably different architecture than its
native counterpart. We emphasise that we only use a naturally
trained classifier with AAA. To evaluate the robustness of our
defense, we attack both the native and the transfer AAA models
in an end-to-end manner using adaptive white-box attacks. We
demonstrate performance of AAA model on three different
datasets: MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10 [17, 31, 13].
In our MNIST and Fashion-MNIST experiments, AAA is a
simple convolutional AE and we use the classifier architectures
provided by Madry et al. 1 and Zheng et al. 2 respectively
for the native classifiers. For the transfer classifiers, we use
networks containing only fully connected layers.
In our CIFAR-10 experiments, AAA uses a U-Net AE
architecture [26]. The main difference between a U-Net AE
and a standard convolutional AE is the use of skip connections,
which are forward feed connections between the encoding and
decoding layers in the network that enable higher fidelity recon-
structions. We also use three different classifier architectures in
our experiments: (1) ResNet architecture provided by Madry et
al.;3 (2) VGG-19 classifier [33]; and (3) a simple DNN
consisting of four convolution layers and a fully connected
layer. As we will discuss in detail later in Section 4.3, we found
that an ensemble adversarial training setup was necessary to
achieve a semi-transferable defense. Thus, the three classifiers
were used as a part of an ensemble of native classifiers.
4.1.1 Training Details
We use the Adam optimizer to adversarially train the AE using
the three loss functions presented in Section 3, i.e. Lxent, Lmse
and Lxent + Lmse. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we
generate the adversarial examples at each training iteration using
a 40-step L∞ bounded PGD attack with a step size of 0.01 and
=0.3 and =0.2 respectively. For CIFAR-10, we generate the
adversarial training inputs using a 10-step L∞ bounded PGD
attack with a step size of 2255 and =
8
255 .
4 For all experiments,
we set the initial learning rate at 0.001 and decrease it if the
validation loss did not improve over five epochs.
4.2. MNIST and Fashion-MNIST Results
We first discuss our MNIST and F-MNIST results. We
evaluate all models against two white-box attacks. For the first
attack, we used a 100-step L∞ bounded PGD attack with step
size of 0.01 and =0.3 and =0.2 respectively. We perform
50 random restarts for each input so an input is only considered
correctly classified if all 50 adversarially modified versions
are correctly classified. For the second attack, we used the
Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack [3]. The attack finds an adversarial
perturbation δ such that:
1https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist challenge
2https://github.com/tianzheng4/Distributionally-
Adversarial-Attack
3https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10 challenge
4We scale the pixel values to the range [0,1]
Input Lxent Lmse Lxent+Lmse
Table 1: Visualization of the output of the AE for the different AAA models. We can see that using Lmse forces the output of the AE to be projected on the
natural data manifold as opposed toLxent, which causes the output of the AE to attain abstract values with predictive strength to minimize the classification loss.
Lxent+Lmse provides a balance as the abstract representations learned byLxent are regularized byLmse.
min
δ
D(x,x+δ)+c∗L(Fθ(x+δ)) (4)
whereD is the distance function and L is the loss function
representing classification performance. In our experiments,
we used L2 version of the attack with c=100 targeting logit loss
based on previous works [27]. We compare the performance
of adversarial training to our approach in Table 2.
For all three loss functions, AAA minimally impacts the
natural accuracy of the naturally trained native classifier, while
significantly improving the adversarial accuracy with respect
to both PGD and CW adversarial examples. AAALmse has
the worst PGD adversarial robustness, especially on F-MNIST,
likely due to the fact that the AE is trained without taking into
account the classification loss.5 We also see that Lmse helps
to improve the model’s robustness to CW adversarial inputs
despite poor adversarial robustness against PGD attacks.
5We attribute the high adversarial accuracy of AAALmse on MNIST to
the simple nature of the dataset. In many studies, it has been shown that the sim-
plicity of MNIST allows for defense solutions that do not scale to larger datasets
Adversarial training is a non-transferable technique to
improve the adversarial robustness of a model. An adversarially
trained model cannot be reused to improve the adversarial
robustness of a different model. In Table 2, we present
the transferability of AAA. Our transferability evaluation
uses a naturally trained fully connected classifier, trained
independently to and on the same data as the native classifier.
We augment the fully connected classifier with the AE
adversarially trained using the naturally trained Madry et al.
classifier architecture. No additional training on AAA was
performed to protect the fully connected classifier.
Unlike our native results, we see that AAALxent has ex-
tremely poor adversarial robustness. This drop in performance
on transfer is likely due to the overfitting of the reconstructed
output to the native classifier. In Table 1, we see that the recon-
structions forLxent are not recognizable to a human, which sug-
gests that they may not generalize well across naturally trained
classifiers as well. As we expected, Lmse encourages better
transferability performance than Lxent as it is an unsupervised
loss objective that serves to regularize the training objective
Models
Native Classifier Transfer Classifier
MNIST Fashion-MNIST MNIST Fashion-MNIST
Natural PGD CW-L2 Natural PGD CW-L2 Natural PGD CW-L2 Natural PGD CW-L2
Natural Training 99.24% 0% 0% 92.55% 5.40% 0% 98.00% 0% 0% 89.74% 4.33% 0%
Adversarial Training 99.10% 88.81% 52.10% 87.73% 62.16% 49.43% 93.32% 71.76% 26.64% 79.11% 61.28% 24.50%
AAALxent 99.08% 90.44% 58.16% 87.59% 68.29% 65.36% 28.75% 11.85% 1.94% 33.60% 22.54% 31.32%
AAALmse 99.17% 89.20% 65.86% 89.26% 21.87% 55.67% 98.21% 82.17% 57.16% 88.38% 28.71% 54.83%
AAALxent+Lmse 99.15% 91.13% 74.44% 87.40% 63.98% 69.35% 98.12% 85.33% 76.61% 74.44% 49.67% 62.67%
Table 2: Comparing adversarial robustness of AAA to the adversarial training approach proposed by Madry et al. [20] on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets.
The PGD attack is a 100-step attack with 50 random restarts. The CW-L2 attack uses c=100 and adversarial examples are successful if L2 distance is less than
3. Transfer classifiers were chosen such as to offer some variability compared the architectures of the native classifier. AAA is able to transfer across both classifiers.
and obtain more generalizable outputs. We see in Table 1,
the reconstructions created when usingAAALmse appear very
similar to natural input samples. However, as it has poor native
adversarial robustness against PGD attacks, the transferability
benefits are limited. By combining the two loss functions, we
see thatAAALxent+Lmse has the best adversarial performance
when transferred to a new classifier. Lxent serves to improve
the robustness to a PGD attack andLmse serves to both improve
the robustness to a CW attack and regularize the reconstructions
to enable transferability. The improvement in transferability
performance can be attributed to the idea that classifiers learn
similar decision boundaries with respect to the natural data [7].
4.3. CIFAR-10 Results
We evaluate AAA using two different metrics. First, we
demonstrate the adversarial robustness of AAA against an
adaptive white-box PGD adversary (perturbation robustness).
Then, we show that AAA improves the robustness of its native
classifiers to natural image corruptions (corruption robustness).
Previous work has identified corruption robustness as a critical
criteria for evaluating overall model robustness [6].
Perturbation Evaluation. We evaluate all models against a
20-step L∞ bounded PGD attack with step size of  = 8255
and  = 2255 with 10 random restarts. Table 3 compares the
robustness of adversarial training to AAA using ResNet as the
native classifier. We also measure the transferability of AAA
using a VGG classifier and simple DNN classifier.
AAALxent and AAALxent+Lmse both result in native
adversarial robustness comparable to adversarial training, with
a similar reduction in natural accuracy. Again, we see that
although Lmse preserves the natural accuracy of the classifier,
it does not have any significant impact on native adversarial
accuracy. With respect to transferability, we see that none of the
three loss functions encourages high transferability suggesting
that the native performance of AAA needs to be improved or
that different loss function may be necessary.
Thus we turn to ensemble adversarial training to create
an AE that improves the adversarial robustness of multiple
classifiers in a single training session [30]. In each training
iteration, we randomly select one of the three naturally trained
classifiers and generate adversarial examples with respect to
the chosen classifier. We adversarially train the AE with respect
to Lxent. We choose to use Lxent as we want to maximize
classification performance across all classifiers in the ensemble.
All of the training parameters remain the same as before
including the number of training epochs. Table 4 compares the
performance of AAA using ensemble adversarial training to
each of the adversarially trained classifiers.
Our results show that AAA has comparable or better per-
formance than traditional adversarial training when evaluated
against the L∞ PGD attack. For VGG and DNN, AAA
significantly improved both the natural and adversarial accuracy
(e.g., an additional 10.12% and 9.17% for DNN’s natural
and adversarial accuracy, respectively). We also performed
an evaluation against the CW L2 attack, but AAA reported
0% accuracy for an L2 distance threshold of 20. This lack of
robustness to the CW attack is likely due to dropping Lmse
from the AE objective function, thus further consideration is
necessary as to the correct loss function for training. However,
using Lxent and ensemble adversarial training still has an
advantage over standard adversarial training beyond improved
robustness to a PGD adversary. Namely, AAA can be used to
protect any one of the three naturally trained classifiers in the
ensemble. With traditional adversarial training, each classifier
would need to be individually trained and the resulting model
cannot be reused to protect one of the other models.
Corruption Evaluation. Recently, Gilmer et al. formally
recognized a relationship between adversarial robustness
and corruption robustness [6]. They showed that adversarial
examples are a natural phenomenon due to the fact that trained
models have non-zero test error on natural image corruptions.
Thus, adversarial robustness can be improved by improving
a model’s robustness to natural image corruptions and vice
versa. Using the corruption dataset provided by Hendrycks
and Dietterich [9], they show that adversarial training, a proven
defense method, significantly improves a model’s robustness to
Model
ResNet (Native) VGG (Transfer) DNN (Transfer)
Natural PGD Natural PGD Natural PGD
Nat. Training 89.67% 0% 91.47% 0% 78.86% 0%
Adv. Training 81.49% 45.89% 71.95% 39.73% 69.48% 36.40%
AAALxent 77.21% 45.67% 25.02% 8.18% 14.25% 0%
AAALmse 86.07% 0% 87.78% 0% 76.77% 0%
AAALxent+Lmse 80.06% 44.93% 30.53% 6.58% 20.08% 1.64%
Table 3: Comparing adversarial robustness of AAA to the adversarial training approach proposed by Madry et al. [20] on CIFAR-10. We perform a 20-step PGD
attack with 10 random restarts. Although AAA fails to transfer, its native performance is still comparable to adversarial training.
Model Natural PGD
ResNetAT 81.49% 45.89%
ResNetAAA 80.06% 45.34%
VGGAT 71.95% 39.73%
VGGAAA 78.22% 42.94%
DNNAT 69.48% 36.40%
DNNAAA 79.60% 45.16%
Table 4: Comparing adversarial robustness AAA with adversarial training.
The AE has been trained using an ensemble of all three naturally trained
classifiers. We perform a 20-step PGD attack with 10 random restarts. AAA
has comparable or better performance that traditional adversarial training.
Gaussian noise corruptions as well as other forms of corruption.
Furthermore, they show that other defense methods, which
employ vanishing gradient strategies, do not result in any
significant improvement on Gaussian noise corruptions. Based
on their results, they suggest that future defense strategies
should evaluate performance on corrupted image distributions
as a sanity check to ensure that vanishing gradients is not the
main explanation for improved adversarial robustness.
Inspired by this, we use the the corruption test set for CIFAR-
10 referred to as CIFAR-10-C [9] and evaluate the corruption
robustness of AAA. We compare the performance of AAA and
adversarial training for each CIFAR-10 classifier and present
these results in Figure 2. Note that only results for 5 of the 19
possible corruptions are shown, but additional figures and the
complete results can be found in the Supplementary materials.
The AAA protected ResNet classifier has comparable
performance to an adversarially trained ResNet classifier. More
advantageously, AAA protected VGG and DNN classifiers
exhibit much greater robustness to natural image corruptions
compared to their adversarially trained versions. Furthermore,
in cases where adversarial training decreases the corruption
robustness, AAA either has a lesser decrease or a positive
increase relative to the baseline natural classifier. Thus, AAA
improves adversarial robustness due to improvements with
respect to natural image corruptions.
5. kNN Reconstruction
Traditionally, given an input, the classifier outputs the label
associated with the highest predicted probability. However,
recent work has found that using a k-nearest neighbors (kNN)
algorithm in the hidden layers of the network can improve
the explainability of neural networks and establish confidence
metrics on classification predictions [25]. For a given input and
a given hidden layer, the k nearest neighbors are selected and the
confidence of a prediction is based on the fraction of neighbors
that agree with the output prediction. On normal inputs, it
was shown that a majority of the k nearest neighbors would
often agree on the predicted label in each hidden layer of a
naturally trained model. However, for adversarial inputs, which
are not part of the training data manifold, there was much more
variability in the labels of the k nearest neighbors, resulting in a
low confidence prediction. Considering the benefits of the kNN
approach, we propose a novel evaluation method using AAA
to enhance its robustness to new types of adversaries, which is
currently a limitation of our work. The kNN evaluation method
using AAA involves the following steps:
1. At test time, for a given image x, let z=Enc(x) be the
latent vector obtained by passing x through the encoder of
our adversarially trained autoencoder (AE). We collect a
set of its k-nearest neighbors {z(0)kNN ,···,z(k)kNN}⊂Ztrain,
where Ztrain={Enc(xi) ∀xi∈Xtrain} andXtrain is
the set of all training images available to us.
2. We generate a kNN consensus latent vector
zˆkNN = 1/k
( ∑k
i=1 z
(i)
kNN
)
which we use instead
of z for reconstruction, i.e. xkNN=Dec(zˆkNN).
3. Finally, xkNN is provided as the input to the classifier
instead of the reconstruction output of z.
Figure 2: Comparing corruption robustness of Adversarial Trained classifiers (AT) to naturally trained classifiers protected by AAA. The AAA in this case has
been trained using the ensemble of all three naturally trained classifiers. The y-axis represent difference in accuracy w.r.t. naturally trained version of the classifier.
In case of the strongest classifier in our ensemble (ResNet), we observe comparable performance between AT and AAA. However, for the weaker classifiers (VGG
and DNN), we observe increased robustness for AAA as compared to AT.
Dataset
NATIVE TRANSFER
Natural PGD Natural PGD
MNIST
AAALxent 98.55% 95.43% (+ 1.89%) 29.67% 27.27% (+ 12.01%)
AAALmse 97.16% 94.36% (+ 2.55%) 97.12% 93.57% (+ 7.66%)
AAALxent+Lmse 98.21% 95.48% (+ 1.44%) 98.12% 95.08% (+ 5.11%)
Fashion-MNIST
AAALxent 58.49% 55.06% (- 21.83%) 38.11% 37.12% (+ 11.87%)
AAALmse 83.30% 76.33% (+ 51.27%) 81.77% 42.06%(+ 9.11%)
AAALxent+Lmse 76.40% 73.00% (- 0.97%) 77.91% 73.78% (+ 22.51%)
Table 5: Comparing adversarial accuracy of kNN reconstruction with the
results in Table 2. We perform a 200-step PGD attack. The numbers within
parentheses indicate the delta in performance between the two evaluation
methods. We observe substantial improvements in adversarial robustness when
using the kNN reconstruction.
Table 5 shows the native and transferability results of kNN
reconstruction on the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST classifiers.
In most cases, kNN reconstruction further improves the
adversarial accuracy of AAA on both the native and transfer
classifiers. Our results suggest that Adversarially-Trained
Autoencoder Augmentation creates an AE, which learns latent
space representations where similar inputs lie close together.
Thus, the kNN consensus latent vector yields a reconstruction
that projects adversarial inputs closer to the correct label cluster.
One drawback of kNN evaluation method is the large perfor-
mance overhead during evaluation. Our naive implementation
of the proposed method does not scale well with the dimension
of the latent vector. Further, the current implementation of
kNN reconstruction performs poorly on CIFAR-10, likely due
to a highly entangled latent space of our current U-Net AE.
However, we believe that with a proper selection of objective
functions, we can develop an AE that projects inputs into a
more separable latent space, thus improving the accuracy of this
approach. We are currently integrating kNN reconstruction with
AAA and measuring the improvement in adversarial robustness
with respect to other adversarial attacks.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose Adversarially-Trained Autoencoder
Augmentation as a model-agnostic adversarial defense. AAA
provides gains in robustness comparable to, and in some cases
better than, traditional adversarial training across a variety of per-
turbations/corruptions. On MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, AAA
improved the robustness against adaptive PGDL∞ bound adver-
sary and CW L2 bound adversary on a naturally-trained clas-
sifier. Furthermore, AAA was able to be transferred to a new,
never before seen classifier and, without any additional training,
improved its adversarial robustness. On CIFAR-10, we used
ensemble adversarial training to create a single autoencoder that
was semi-transferable across an ensemble of naturally trained
classifier. In this setting, AAA was able to improve the adver-
sarial robustness of each naturally-trained classifier in the en-
semble achieving, at a minimum, comparable adversarial perfor-
mance to adversarial training. Finally, based on previous work
which uncovered the relationship between a model’s robustness
to natural image corruptions and its adversarial robustness, we
measured the natural image corruption robustness of AAA. Our
evaluation revealed that AAA outperforms traditional adversar-
ial training across multiple image corruptions. To our knowl-
edge, Adversarially-Trained Autoencoder Augmentation repre-
sents the first model-agnostic adversarial defense that is robust
to a class of adaptive adversaries and natural image corruptions.
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